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ong Kong is a Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) under 
the sovereign control of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC). It is governed under the country’s One Country Two Systems 
framework. This means that HKSAR is considered as an inalienable 
part of China’s territory. Amidst this, it is given a degree of leeway to 
conduct its own affairs within the parameters set by the Hong Kong 
Basic Law that was provided for by the Central Government of the 
People’s Republic of China. As far as the Basic Law is concerned, 
Hong Kong’s status as a special administrative region allows it a high 
degree of autonomy that differentiates it from the autonomous 
regions inside China which have a limited sense of autonomy, 
contrary to their categorization. The perks of being an SAR includes 
expanding Hong Kong’s capacity to conduct its own domestic 
(political, judicial and legislative) affairs and its economic relations 
H
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both within and outside of China. In essence, HKSAR is capable of 
practicing both political and fiscal autonomy though with certain 
limitations, as any decentralized system would. It is apparent that 
Hong Kong has benefited from its autonomy. This paper posits that 
a decentralized system of government like that of HKSAR draws 
power from different sources. Given its limited freedom to self-
determination, Hong Kong desire for political autonomy is drawn 
from the confidence it developed because of its strong sense of fiscal 
autonomy. In this light, this paper aims to look into the following 
questions: What policies and provisions from China secure Hong 
Kong’s fiscal autonomy? How did Hong Kong exercise its fiscal 
autonomy? What were the ramifications of Hong Kong’s fiscal 
autonomy on its pursuit for political autonomy? 
Before proceeding, some preliminary questions must first be 
answered. 
PRC-HK Fiscal Relations 
Although the island of Hong Kong has always been an inalienable 
part of China’s vast territory, there was a time when it was colonized 
by foreign powers. Most notable of which was Great Britain’s 
occupation of the island for 156 years which ended in July 1 of 1997 
(Reuters, 2007). The end of British rule on Hong Kong was 
formalized when Great Britain and the People’s Republic of China 
agreed that the island would maintain its autonomy from its 
sovereign for 50 years after the transfer (Cheung, 1998, p.308; HK 
Basic Law art.5). The legal manifestation of this agreement is in the 
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form of the One Country Two Systems framework that China has 
been practicing in Hong Kong and Macau since their return to 
China in 1997 and 1998 respectively. The Basic Law and the 
establishment of Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region of 
China would have adverse effects on the relationship between 
Beijing and its regional counterpart. The first point that the Basic 
Law puts forward is the recognition of the PRC’s role as the 
sovereign state and that HKSAR is an inalienable part of the 
country (HK Basic Law art.1). Since the agreement between Great 
Britain and China decided to preserve Hong Kong’s autonomous 
status for 50 years after the transfer, the PRC recognizes that 
HKSAR will not practice socialism and will continue to practice 
capitalism (HK Basic Law art. 5, 18). To honor this distinction, the 
central government of the PRC and its different regions and 
municipalities are not allowed to interfere in the internal affairs of 
Hong Kong (HK Basic Law art.14, 22). Amidst this sense of 
autonomy in the region, there are some limitations on what 
HKSAR can and cannot do. As part of a decentralized system such 
as China, Hong Kong cannot completely pursue self-determination 
since it is not a sovereign state. Recalling that Article 1 of the Basic 
Law brings Hong Kong back to the reality that it is still merely a part 
of China, albeit a significant part of it. Because of this, the region is 
only allowed to exercise a limited amount of political autonomy 
since this is an aspect of decentralization that the Central 
Government in Beijing is weary of completely downloading to the 
region.  
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Chapter V of the Basic Law spells this out by focusing on Hong 
Kong’s economy. First and foremost, HKSAR independently 
manages its own finances without having to send it back to the 
central government (HK Basic Law art. 106). It also has the 
capacity to practice its own independent taxation system and enact 
laws that concern the types of taxes, tax rates, tax reductions, 
allowances and exemptions, and other matters of taxation (HK 
Basic Law art. 108). And while the region’s foreign affairs are 
represented by the people in the central government, it is still 
allowed to use the name Hong Kong, China when participating in 
relevant international organizations and international trade 
agreements (HK Basic Law art. 116). When compared to the legal 
grounds for Hong Kong’s political autonomy, its capacity to 
determine its fiscal policy is considerably greater. While the 
selection of the region’s leadership continues to be under the 
supervision of the central government thus raising public 
disenfranchisement on Beijing, Hong Kong’s fiscal intentions are 
given more leeway. It is apparent that Beijing has a sense of 
confidence in Hong Kong. Support for downloading fiscal 
responsibilities down to the regional level shows how China puts 
trust on HKSAR’s capacity to deliver positive results, as it has done 
so in the past. 
Hong Kong’s Exercise of Fiscal Autonomy 
While Hong Kong remains as a region of the PRC, albeit one 
with limitations in some respects, its freedom to run its fiscal 
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agenda independently has been a defining factor of its identity. 
This has been characterized by maximizing its capacities in trade. 
Since it has historically and continuously acted as an important 
backdoor into China, engagement with the international 
community played an important role in Hong Kong’s pursuit in 
exercising its fiscal autonomy. For starters, it is worth 
remembering that the government in China allowed Hong Kong to 
use its name and title when participating in relevant international 
organizations and international trade (HK Basic Law 116). Because 
of this, it has entered into a number of negotiations and joined 
international institutions in the past. A good example of this was 
when Hong Kong became an official member of the GATT in 1997 
and an original member of the WTO since 1995. China allowed 
HKSAR to continue its membership in the GATT, and it would 
later on join the WTO in 2001 as well. 
Still under the title of “Hong Kong, China”, HKSAR was also 
able to establish bilateral agreements and relations with foreign 
actors and institutions on many subjects ranging from air services, 
investment promotions and protection, to taxation, and mutual 
legal assistance, among others (Zeng, 2003). Zeng’s work identified 
80 bilateral agreements between Hong Kong and other actors. This 
was an unprecedented move for HKSAR given its status as a non-
sovereign country. According to the website of Hong Kong’s Trade 
and Industry Department, it is a member of the following 
international trade organizations: World Trade Organization, Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation, Organization of Economic Cooperation  
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and Development’s Trade Committee, and the Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Council. Likewise, it has one signed Free Trade 
Agreement with ASEAN, five are in force, and three are under 
negotiation. Hong Kong is considered the first autonomous entity 
to enter into that many bilateral treaties in its name with foreign 
countries. It is apparent that Hong Kong’s title as a Special 
Administrative Region has deep implications on its fiscal policy. 
Given the considerable number of bilateral agreements and 
memberships it holds in international trade organizations, the 
government of Hong Kong puts fiscal autonomy into practice 
mostly by maximizing its identity as a corporate actor, which 
allows it to make transactions and enter into agreements with 
other foreign entities. Hong Kong’s choice to do so helps boost its 
economic performance and presence in the international 
community. These engagements abroad add a new layer on the 
relationship between China and Hong Kong since support for the 
latter’s role in establishing agreements with other countries entails 
the former to further secure the latter’s autonomy. And further 
supporting its autonomy would also have implications in areas 
outside of Hong Kong’s fiscal interests. 
Impacts of Hong Kong’s Fiscal Autonomy 
The government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region chose to maximize its corporate identity by engaging the 
international community. Even prior to the transfer, the island was 
relatively successful in managing its economy. During the many 
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years that the PRC isolated itself from the world, foreign investors 
and entrepreneurs perceived Hong Kong as the ideal backdoor into 
the Chinese economy. Foreign trade in Hong Kong played a 
significant role in defining who the region is today. Roughly 20 
years before the transfer was even made, Hong Kong was identified 
as one of Four Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, 
South Korea) which established it as a newly industrialized 
economy given its fast industrial growth. Given its history as a 
well-managed economy, it comes as no surprise that China allows 
Hong Kong to have more freedom in its fiscal capacities than its 
political ones, given the PRCs one-party system form of 
government (CFR 2018). Considering its status as an NIE back in 
the 70s, Hong Kong was in a particularly privileged position 
regarding the potential of its economy. While it has suffered the 
occasional let-down of the two financial crises that affected Asia 
and the world (i.e., the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and the 
Global Financial Crisis of 1999), the data gathered from CEIC 
showed how quickly the region was able to get back on its feet after 
the shocks of both crises.  Hong Kong, being a part of the PRC, one 
of the contributing countries to the economic rebound after both 
crises, also benefited from this political-geographic relationship. 
This capacity of Hong Kong to perform well even under such 
difficult conditions has boosted confidence both in it both locally 
and internationally. 
On the foreign front, the international community continues to 
build economic trade relations with Hong Kong. The region’s  
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potential and capacity for trade is highlighted by the willingness of 
these countries to enter into bilateral trade agreements and free 
trade agreements between their governments and a non-state actor 
such as Hong Kong. This has been a significant development in the 
field of intergovernmental trade since there has never been such a 
high level of support for a non-stake actor given by the 
international community. This recognition has further legitimized 
the role and capacity of HKSAR to act independently of the 
People’s Republic of China even though it is bound to it. This has 
broadened the role of fiscal decentralization in the context of Hong 
Kong-China relations. The stability of Hong Kong’s economy that 
was brought about by its capacity to maximize its corporate 
identity has also strengthened regionalist sentiments. Its 
manifestation is on the re-establishment of a Hong Kong or 
Cantonese identity that is distinct from that of the PRC (Wong. 
2016; Pei, 2014). The rise of regionalist sentiment in HKSAR has 
reaffirmed the island’s desire for self-sufficiency. Given the feats of 
Hong Kong’s capacity for fiscal autonomy wherein it is able to 
establish bilateral and multilateral ties with sovereign states, it is 
apparent that there seems to be no desire to further deepen its 
fiscal autonomy. On the economic end, the most recent threat to 
its economy has been the liberalization of Shanghai since it created 
a new regional competitor against Hong Kong (SCMP, 2013). 
Noticeably, there is no apparent public clamor regarding 
expanding on its freedom to control and manipulate its own 
economic activities since the region has generally benefited from it. 
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The most recent direction of public discourse in Hong Kong was 
geared more towards the furthering of democratic procedures and 
principles. Namely, on the issue of universal suffrage for the people 
of Hong Kong to choose their leaders for themselves. Such was the 
rise of the Umbrella Movement back in 2013, which became 
another strain on the relationship between Beijing and its 
counterpart in Hong Kong. In essence then, Hong Kong’s drive to 
deepen its political autonomy is not entirely a political agenda on 
its own. The desire to move for a deepening of political freedoms is 
grounded on the fact that the region has a strong sense of 
economic determination that drives it to desire for less concrete 
and more abstract principles such as democracy and universal 
suffrage. 
Conclusions 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is an area within the 
territory of the People’s Republic of China wherein the national 
government ideology of socialism is not observed. In place of 
following the state ideology, the island was allowed to continue 
with its pre-existing capitalist ideation under British rule. When 
the British were about to transfer Hong Kong back to the PRC in 
1997, the two parties agreed that for 50 years Hong Kong SAR 
would be left as an autonomously run region within the territorial 
area of China. Since Hong Kong has had a considerably degree of 
success, given the NIE status it received back in the 1970s, the PRC 
was less reluctant to download fiscal authority to the region since it  
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had succeeded in doing just that prior to its transfer back to China. 
This has been stipulated in chapter V of the Hong Kong Basic Law. 
It specifically highlights how HKSAR will have the right to control 
its own budget allotment separate from the PRC, have its own set 
of taxation rules and regulations, and most importantly the right to 
use the name Hong Kong, China when dealing with other trade 
entities. 
Among the three points that were highlighted as the areas in 
which HKSAR could manoeuvre its own fiscal needs, it is in the 
third point where Hong Kong seems to shine. By taking on the 
name of “Hong Kong, China”, the government of Hong Kong 
gains a corporate type of identity that allows it to make 
transactions and sue. While the latter is seldom if ever used, 
HKSAR has very wisely made sure to maximize its capacity to 
make deals and transactions with the international community. Its 
decision to use its corporate identity when engaging with other 
entities has allowed it to gain traction and support from the 
international community. This has been an astonishing 
achievement for a non-state actor such as itself since there has 
never been a case when members of the international community 
have been more eager to support ongoing and pursuing trade 
relations with Hong Kong. In a way, this has some implication on 
HK-PRC relations. Other countries are willing to engage with 
Hong Kong because of two factors. First is it proximity to China 
and acting as a bridge or conduit between the two where foreign 
products and markets are able to enter the then closed PRC. 
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Second, Hong Kong’s fiscal autonomy as an Special Administrative 
Region allows it to openly trade with the outside world since 
socialist state ideologies do not apply in Hong Kong. This support 
and interest from the international community pressures China to 
sustain the fiscal autonomy that it has been enjoying for years. On 
the other end, fiscal autonomy also brought with it the rise of a 
distinctly Hong Kong identity that is separate from the Mainland 
Chinese identity. This group is more regionalistic and appreciative 
of the achievements that their region has made amidst the 
limitations of their constitutional mandates. With this regard, 
fiscal policy brought fourth a Hong Kong identity that was proud 
of its regional roots and were willing to pursue them further. 
The furthering of the Hong Kong identity, formed rather 
unintentionally by the fiscal decentralization process that China 
implemented on the region, has also furthered a regional desire for 
further self-determination. For the most part, this has been a 
movement towards universal suffrage. Advocates of this identity 
tend to look for a deepening of political autonomy, without 
abandoning the One Country Two Systems framework. If any, this 
new breed of people are more concerned with attaining universal 
suffrage and true representation for the Hong Kong people 
through popular elections, which is not an irrational notion since it 
is specifically stipulated within the constitutionally mandated goals 
of the Hong Kong Basic Law. 
 
In the end, the decentralization process that happened in Hong 
Kong SAR was part of a negotiation between two parties. Hong 
12   DIZON | HONG KONG EXPERIENCE OF DECENTRALIZATION  
 
 
 
 
 
CHINESE STUDIES PROGRAM LECTURE SERIES    © Ateneo de Manila University 
No. 5, 2018: 1–15                                                                           http://journals.ateneo.edu 
 
Kong, while in the middle of it all, was allowed to keep its 
autonomy on particular areas of government. To be specific, China 
chose to download fiscal responsibilities down to its regional 
counterpart in Hong Kong but opted to limit the downloading of 
political responsibilities given the importance of the Communist 
Party still maintaining some form of control over the island. 
Amidst this however, this study showed that even though the PRC 
tried to limit the degree of political autonomy experienced by 
Hong Kong it found a way to resurface. The key ingredient in the 
resurfacing of this regional level interest to increase political 
autonomy from China was identity. This identity was formed out 
of an increasing confidence in the capacity of Hong Kong to act 
and take of itself both internally and externally. Aside from 
identity, the root of all this change and development in Hong Kong 
was the downloading of fiscal capabilities into its own system. 
Particularly, the idea of self-representation in the international 
trading community by legally taking on a corporate role as a non-
state actor. The case of Hong Kong shows how a single key 
provision matched with an opportunity.  
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